Obama to Trump Voters

People who voted for Obama in 2012 and for Trump in 2016, about 5.7 million voters, played an essential role in Trump’s victory. A research paper by Stephen Morgan and Jiwon Lee explore the characteristics of these voters. While their research focuses primarily on white non-Hispanic “crossover” voters they also discuss the characteristics of white non-Hispanic voters who did not vote in 2012 but voted for Trump in 2016. The authors also generate some comparisons between these two sets of voters and Romney-Trump voters.

Cross-pressured voters are those voters who are subject to conflicts and inconsistencies in whom to vote for. These voters tend to be late voters, often making up their minds at the last moment or not voting at all, remaining undecided. Morgan and Lee focus on Obama-to-Trump (O-T) voters, who represented between 9 and 14% of Trump’s popular vote total. These voters were disproportionately members of the white working class. They were critically important to Trump’s victory because they expanded the normal Republican Party electorate – most Republicans remained loyal to their party and voted for Trump. They were much larger in number than the Romney-to-Clinton voters.

Two explanations

The research literature on O-T voters contains several different theses or explanations of why voters who voted for Obama in 2012 would vote for Trump in 2016. One school of thought argues that white nativism, racial resentment, and threats to status energized the O-T voters. Others argue that economic populism and place-based economic interests, residents of counties with weak or nonexistent economic growth, drove these crossover voters. Some scholars suggest that economic interests and racial identity combined to influence these voters, but generally either the economic theme or the racial identity theme are identified as being most important.

Morgan and Lee focus on two possible explanations. One they call “surging white nativism” and the other, “economic populism with bandwagon bigotry.”

White nativism

According to the white nativism thesis, the 2016 election was much different than the 2012 election. There was no incumbent. Clinton celebrated diversity and global citizenship. Trump spoke about how strong America was in the past and how America’s security was threatened by Muslims and Mexicans. More specifically, he argued that globalists had undermined America’s manufacturing base.

The white nativism thesis suggests that “many white voters, especially those with low levels of education who had never experienced the sort of diversity that is typical of institutions of higher education, or coursework that values it, chose to shift loyalties from Obama to Trump. Their loyalty to Obama was narrowly instrumental in the first place and had little or no affective foundation.”

The authors question the applicability of this thesis to O-T voters. They point out that neither the Tea Party activists nor Trump’s false 2011 birtherism claim convinced these voters to vote Republican in the 2012 election. The white nativism thesis, in the view of the authors, “seems much more applicable to voters who either (1) supported Romney in 2012 because the Democratic Party does not welcome bigotry or (2) did not vote in 2012 because neither party endorsed white supremacy.”

However, they admit that Trump’s identity rhetoric could have led to some 2012 Obama voters to support Trump. They disagree, however, with the theory advocated by Mutz that suggests “many white voters came to regret their 2012 votes,” falling into an affective trap in defense, and then were transformed in 2016 because Trump brought out their latent feelings of status threat.”

Economic populism with bandwagon bigotry

Trump relentlessly pursued the jobs and trade theme in his debates with Clinton. As the authors point out, Clinton was “almost defenseless when he argued that jobs had been lost to China and Mexico and that he, by restricting immigration and renegotiating trade deals, could bring them back.” This economic populism thesis suggests that O-T voters had “a willingness to hold aside their racial prejudice in 2012 because Romney was unappealing, especially on economic matters.” Further, “these voters, who had generic Republican levels of racial prejudice already, viewed Trump’s identity rhetoric as unexceptional…” At the same time, these voters saw immigration primarily from the perspective of low-skilled immigrants being a threat to American working-class voters. They weren’t particularly prejudiced against immigrants and did not see immigrants as a threat to national culture.

These voters responded adversely to media coverage that suggested racial motives or media coverage that suggested those opposed to immigration for reasons other than economic. If these voters were relatively race-neutral and they voted for Obama four years earlier, then voting for Trump would not be seen as a racist act, particularly, as the media predicted, if Clinton would be victorious.

O-T voter characteristics

Demographic

• Compared to Obama to Clinton voters, no vote to Trump, and Romney to Trump, the O-T voters resided much more in the Midwest and had high school degrees or less.
• Relative to socioeconomic class the O-T voters were more numerous in the skilled manual workers and semi- and unskilled manual workers than were Obama to Clinton voters, no vote to Trump voters, and Romney to Trump voters. The no vote to Trump voters were closely aligned with Romney-Trump voters and somewhat more likely to reside in the South.

Political identity

• Relative to attachment and political identity the O-T voters were mostly centrists, especially after adjusting for age, gender, education, and class
  They were more likely than Romney-Trump voters to be involved with and feel positive about labor unions.
• They were the least interested in politics and were more likely to feel the rich controlled politics than were Romney-Trump voters.
• They did not discuss politics with family and friends.
• They were more likely to decide which candidate to support within one month of the election date.

Tradition

• O-T voters had clear tendencies of those who have more of a stake in the past than in the present. They are more likely than Obama-Clinton voters to value tradition and the past but are between both party-loyalist groups in accepting changes in morality. Because O-T voters more strongly support those who defy traditional ways they may have been drawn to Trump’s tendency to defy political correctness. However, O-T voters are considerably weaker in valuing the past than are Romney-Trump voters.

Economics

• O-T voters felt more economic vulnerability than Obama-Clinton voters.
• They were between both groups (Obama-Clinton and Romney-Trump) on economic progressivism and economic libertarianism.
• O-T voters more so than the other two groups perceived global trade as a threat and were in the center on tradeoffs between environmental protections and job growth.
• O-T voters perceived the country’s economic health as much more compromised than Obama-Clinton voters but were also less convinced than Romney-Trump voters that economic opportunities were increasing or that inequality was stable or trending lower. In sum, Trump’s global trade message probably helped some Obama-to-Trump voters defect from Obama.

Racial issues

• The white, non-Hispanic white O-T voters held views on race closer to Romney-Trump voters than Obama-Clinton voters. They differed greatly from Obama-Clinton voters and were more typical in this regard to generic Republican voters. O-T voters, however, are more supportive of affirmative action policies than Romney-Trump voters.

On immigration and the economic consequences of immigration

• O-T voters were like Romney-Trump voters and differed from Obama-Clinton voters. O-T voters had more negative attitudes toward all immigrants and toward illegal or unauthorized or undocumented immigrants.
• Much more so than Obama-Clinton voters they believed that immigrants take away jobs and damage the economy. Consequently, they were much less likely to support increases in immigration.
• Obama-Clinton voters saw immigration as much less an economic threat than did O-T voters. Given the position of the two candidates, Clinton and Trump, it is not surprising that Trump’s position on the economy and immigration would be attractive to cross-pressured voters who eventually voted for Trump.

In conclusion, Morgan and Lee suggest that “racialized economics” played the dominant role in cross-pressured voters voting in the end for Trump. In using the phrase racialized economics, they believe that while both racism and economics caused these voters to commit to Trump, economics was the more dominant of the two.

Conclusions

Overall, from their research they draw these specific conclusions about Obama-to-Trump voters:

• They identify as white-only, non-Hispanic with lower levels of education and higher rates of working-class membership, and live in the Midwest.
• They have lower levels of political interest and are centrist in both party affiliation and ideology
• Except for trade policy, which they see as a greater threat than both Democratic and Republican party loyalists, they were centrists on economic issues.
• They claimed to have more experience with economic vulnerability than Democratic party loyalists of comparable social standing.
• For most racial attitudes they have a profile very similar to Republican loyalists, but they recognize racial obstacles and are slightly more supportive of affirmative action than Republican party loyalists.

The authors also were able to draw some conclusions about voters who did not vote in 2012 and who in 2016 voted for Trump.

• They have profiles like Republican loyalists on both demographic characteristics and on attitudes toward race.
• They are were more centrists on economic issues than Republican loyalists but less centrist than O-T voters.
• They had less political interest than Democratic or Republican loyalists, but they were not late deciders in the election.

Given these findings, the authors attempt to answer their broader question of whether it was (1) surging white nativism or (2) economic populism with bandwagon bigotry that triggered cross-pressured Obama voters to vote for Trump.

In addition to using data from both the American National Elections Studies, the authors also use the General Social Surveys from 2004 through 2016. The GSS shows that the racial attitudes of whites, including those from the working class, did not change much for the 2016 election year.

Further, an examination of the 2018 GSS suggests that racial attitudes moderated between 2016 and 2018. The authors suggest that this evidence “should allay the eminently reasonable concern that Trump’s emphasis on identity issues has pushed the racial prejudice and resentment of whites higher since he officially entered national politics in 2015.”

In comparing these data with conclusions reached by other authors who focus on the significance of white identity, the authors believe that their (that is, Morgan and Lee) assessment is more accurate. They conclude the evidence does not “support the existence of such a surge [in white nativism].”

They go on to say that in 2012 “a sufficient number of cross-pressured voters decided to support Obama, in part because their economic centrism left them unimpressed with Romney…These cross-pressured voters supported Obama because they wanted to give him another four years to see if he could grow the economy in an equitable and balanced way, and the support of labor unions, who reminded them of Obama’s auto bailout and other stimulus funding, was a critical factor in their thinking.”

Finally, they take issue about the extent to which the activation of identity, especially racial identity, generated support for Trump among white Obama 2012 voters.

Comment

This is the second micro-analysis post of the 2016 election. Morgan and Lee show some differences between O-T voters and general white support for Trump that was the focus of the first post. Overall, the general white supporter of Trump was much more anti-immigrant than the O-T voters. The O-T voters’ negative perception of immigration focused almost entirely on their perception of immigrants’ adverse effects on the economy and jobs. General white support for Trump appeared to be hostile to immigrants and immigration across the board.

A second difference is that O-T voters had less hostility or adversity to racial minorities, including blacks. Overall white support for Trump was more resentful of blacks.

The 2018 GSS report, mentioned by Morgan and Lee, reinforces their conclusions regarding changing white attitudes toward blacks. It shows that “more Americans than ever (52%) say that the government spends too little on improving the conditions of blacks and that more say the government should try to make up for past discrimination (28%). These increases occurred across ages and racial groups and among Democrats, independents, and Republicans.
Additionally, “Americans overall are also now more likely to attribute inequalities between blacks and whites to discrimination (up from 33% in 2014 to 50% in 2018) and are less likely to attribute them to lack of motivation or will among blacks (down from 45% in 2014 to 36% in 2018. White Democrats show some of the largest shifts in attitudes.”

The issue on which the overall white supporter of Trump and the O-T voter most agreed with each other dealt with the economy, especially the loss of manufacturing jobs and the adverse impact of global trade.

To me, the Morgan and Lee article suggests that many O-T voters may be ready to vote for someone other than Trump. To the extent that jobs and the economy have not improved for white working-class voters, especially in the Mid-America, these voters may be ready to go back to a Democratic nominee. Additionally, because the O-T voters have less racial animosity than Romney-Trump voters and are less hostile to immigration per se than Romney-Trump voters, they may be less supportive and perhaps even opposed to the egregious treatment of immigrant children as well as Trump’s racist comments.

The recently released report of the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group, “Two Tears In,” suggests the likelihood of some O-T voters going back to the Democratic Party. A section of the report, “Obama-Trump Voters Less Supportive of Trump Since 2016,” makes the following observation:

“Only Obama-Trump voters have had a significant change in their view of President Trump over the last two years. In the 2016 VOTER survey, more than 8 in 10 (85%) Obama-Trump voters held a ‘favorable’ view of the president – 19 percentage points higher than in 2019 (66 percent). Even small movement among these voters – who represented 5 percent [note the lack of correspondence with Morgan and Lee] of voters in 2016 – may prove significant heading into the 2020 presidential election. Obama-Trump voters are also disproportionately white, non-college educated and, as a result, are likely to be well distributed geographically for the purpose of electoral impact.”