Political Polarization and COVID-19 Avoidance (1B)

The first post in this series on political polarization and the COVID-19 pandemic. It focused on the reactions of right-wing populism toward public health guidelines that recommended various ways to combat the spread of the coronavirus. I then noted that I thought the research did not pay enough attention to the communication and information ecology played in explaining the behavior of right-wing populists. Since that post, several very recent papers deal with issues related to the first paper. I highlight three papers that flesh out the analysis contained in the first post.

What masks social conservatism’s reluctance to adhere to pandemic guidelines?

A recent paper by Samore et al. examines the relationship between social conservatism and cautionary behavior toward COVID-19. They ask whether the traditional understanding of ideological differences and responses to pathogenic threats holds with COVID-19 and in America’s politically polarized environment. Prior research suggests social liberals are less pathogenic-avoidant than tradition-valuing social conservatives. Yet, the more conservative Republican party has tended to minimize the dangers of COVID-19.

This research explores whether the “consumption of, and attitudes toward, different sources of information, as well as different evaluation of various threats caused by the pandemic . . . mask the contributions of social conservatism.”

The study finds that socially conservative attitudes correlate with self-reported efforts to impede the onset of COVID-19 but only for Democrats. For Republicans and independents, lower trust in scientists, lower trust in liberal and moderate news sources, lesser consumption of liberal news media, and greater economic conservatism suppress the relationship between social conservatism and COVID-19 avoidant behavior.

The authors define traditionalism as the endorsing of traditional practices and norms where tradition generates both a moral value that is real or imagined as deeply cultural. Socially conservative political parties frame their positions on social issues as maintaining past values and practices. However, social conservatism and economic conservativism have different foci. Social conservatism reflects attitudes toward social change, while economic conservatism focuses on fiscal policy.

Often these two types of conservatism are found in the same political party, such as in the Republican party. Nonetheless, the authors suggest that social conservatism and not economic conservatism will drive pathogen avoidance. Therefore, “all else equal, individuals who hold more socially conservative political attitudes ought to be more avoidant of the direct health threats posed by COVID-19.” Yet Republicans take a more skeptical view of COVID-19 dangers.

To examine why this may be the case, the authors note that economic conservatives may believe the economic and personal liberty threats may be more significant than public health threats. But they also examine the extent to which other variables may drive partisan differences in pathogen avoidance. These other factors include (1) media consumption habits, (2) political attitudes distinct from social conservatism, and (3) demographics.

Media consumption habits

The study covers several sources of information including (1) a range of individual media figures such as Ruch Limbaugh and Rachel Maddow, (2) health officials such as Dr. Anthony Fauci, (3) politicians such as Donald Trump, (4) media organizations such as Fox News and The New York Times, (5) health organizations such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and (6) other categories of people such liberal or conservative journalists and medical scientists.

Three information factors emerge from the above list: (1) trust in scientists, (2) trust in liberal and moderate information sources, and (3) trust in conservative information sources. Given these three factors, the study points out Republicans and Independents have lower trust in both scientists and liberal and moderate media sources. Conservative media express greater doubt concerning the seriousness of the pandemic. Republicans and Democrats tend to occupy differing social-network and corporate-media environments.

The study also suggests that the relationship between media consumption and beliefs appears bidirectional. That is, news content shapes partisan perspectives, especially regarding beliefs about scientific issues. And individuals select and trust news sources that comport with their prior views.

Prior research suggests that well-known conservatives and conservative media have doubted science long before the advent of COVID-19. Among conservatives, trust in science has declined for at least the last several decades. This reduced trust in science and in liberal/moderate information sources, however, did not increase social conservatives’ trust in conservative media voices.

Economic conservatism

Republicans and Independents tend toward stronger economic conservatism. Republicans, especially, are more concerned about the economic consequences of the pandemic. The study suggests that the more economically conservative Republicans may discount the health risks of the pandemic compared to economic considerations. Thus economic conservatism suppresses the relationship between socially conservative attitudes and precautionary pandemic behaviors.

The authors posit that economic conservatism may be more ideological than behavioral. That is, neither Republicans nor Democrats reported taken steps to protect themselves from the pandemic’s economic consequences.

The conservative media and conservative leaders tended to prioritize the economic dangers of lockdowns over the pandemic’s health threats. The study suggests that Republicans relative to Democrats are more exposed to and/or seek out informational environments that minimize pandemic health threats and emphasize threats that more strongly connect with the economic conservatism and libertarianism that characterize many Republicans.

Who complies with social norms although they disagree with these norms?

The second paper, by Alashoor et al., reaches this conclusion: “most of our sample is compliant with social distancing norms whether their attitudes were positive about social distancing or not. This finding was robust across demographics that we measured, such as age, gender, education, ethnicity, political affiliation, and political ideology, with the exception of those who voted for Donald Trump for president of the U.S. in 2016. Trump voters were just as likely to practice social distancing as non-Trump voters if their attitudes were positive about social distancing. If attitudes were negative, Trump voters were more likely to be non-compliant.”

Attitudes and social norms

Individual attitudes strongly predict behaviors, including health-related behaviors. Research shows that individual attitudes toward COVID-19 significantly affect compliance with health guidance. However, people also typically comply with social norms even if their attitudes are unfavorable for the behavior promoted by those norms.

Thus the authors suggest that individual attitudes toward social distancing influence compliance with those guidelines but that different social groups will behave differently because of their social norms. They ask which groups in America will ignore social norms for compliance with social distancing guidelines due to negative attitudes toward those social norms?

In identifying these non-conforming groups the research controls for political party affiliation (Democrat, Republican, Independent, or Other) and political ideology in a 5-point scale ranging from very liberal through very conservative. The paper also controls for religion on a 7-point scale ranging from not at all religious to extremely religious. It also asks whether a person voted for Trump or did not vote for Trump. The authors label the Trump voters as “populist” because they control for political party and political ideology. They also tested whether age, gender, education, or ethnicity moderated the relationship between attitude and social distancing.

The authors also controlled for several variables that might affect attitudes and behaviors. They measure:(1) life satisfaction, suggesting that those scoring higher in life satisfaction would be more willing to leave their homes; (2) the perceived risk of COVID-19, reasoning that those who saw a higher risk would less likely leave their homes; and (3) the perceived benefit of not staying at home, suggesting those who enjoy going out and social gatherings would more likely leave their homes.

Additionally, they measured media exposure in two ways, social media exposure and television exposure.

Findings

The research’s basic finding is that non-Trump voters tended to conform with social norms while Trump voters were more likely to be the non-conformists during the COVID-19 pandemic. For most groups, attitude toward social distancing matters less than openness to compliance with social norms. This finding comports with prior research that indicates demographics poorly predict COVID-19 social distance norms.

Prior research into Trump voters suggests a significant populist, anti-establishment sentiment, but a sentiment that is not always consistent with conservative ideology or the Republican party. This suggests that an anti-elite messaging may work effectively with populists.

Lastly, the authors note that much of the population has voluntarily adapted its belief system to comply with social distancing norms. They find this remarkable because these norms are not consistent with the notions of individual liberty and freedom that tend to be strong in American society.

Does political party trump ideology?

The final paper I consider is one by Barber and Pope. This is a solid political science paper that examines the long-standing issue of whether a political party is more important than political ideology or vice-versa. Another way of phrasing this is to ask, are people Republicans (Democrats) because they are conservatives (liberals) or are they conservatives (liberals) because they are Republicans (Democrats)?

The research rationale behind the paper is that because Trump is non-ideological, he has taken positions that are sometimes more like Republicans and at other times more like Republicans. The authors try to determine whether Republicans or conservatives change positions when Trump changes positions, responding to Trump’s cues.

Primary findings

• Low-knowledge respondents, strong Republicans, those who approve of Trump, and even self-described conservatives are the most likely to move toward a liberal position when Trump takes a liberal stance and to a more conservative position when Trump takes a conservative stance.
• Among Republicans, the politically knowledgeable, those who do not approve of Trump, and self-described liberals or moderates are not likely to change their views to move toward Trump’s positions.
• Large, predictable segments of the public – partisans, the less-informed, approvers of the party leader (Trump), and even those who claim the strongest ideological labels – are likely to be influenced more by partisanship than by any issue content.
• The study’s results undermine the idea of self-described, symbolic, ideology as a meaningful measure of operational ideology among the public. Self-described ideological conservatives were very quick to respond positively and significantly to Trump’s liberal cues. The results for more moderate and liberal Republicans were negligible.
• Partisanship is clearly the root cause of opinion for many respondents and ideology – symbolic or operational – is simply less powerful than the pull of the spirit of the party. Voters choosing ideologically consistent or proximate candidates seem to take a back seat to partisan attachments and group loyalty. Voters are not polarized in the sense that they hold consistent ideological views. Rather their polarization is merely a reflection of the partisan team to which they happen to belong and will remain loyal to, in whatever ideological direction the party moves. That kind of unprincipled, but loyal, behavior should probably worry political observers a great deal.

Findings directly related to Trump

• The group most likely to exhibit loyalist behavior are those who believe in Trump and what he represents. For those who most strongly approve of Trump, the actual content of Trump’s position is not relevant. They react to Trump’s position in whatever fashion Trump offers it.
• In the case of Trump, those who self-identify as strongly conservative are more committed to the party label that happens to be associated with conservatism than they are any underlying conservative policies.
• The leader who provides the cues toward which Republicans move cannot simply be any member of the party, but a leader with a great deal of clout and influence who can plausibly move party member positions on key issues. We do not know of any leader besides Trump who can fit these conditions. No group reacts to a cue that comes from Republican leaders in Congress.
• Though we do not know exactly what proportion of the Republicans partisan loyalists are, we do see that the Trump cue, on average, moves this group halfway toward having the same average issue consistency as pure independents. That is a substantial shift and would represent a major change in the Republican Party.
• Those who call themselves strong conservatives are most likely to be influenced by Trump’s position whether that position is a conservative one or a liberal one.
• Those who identify as being strongly conservative are also more likely to identify strongly with the Republican Party and approve of Trump’s performance as president. Those with higher levels of political knowledge are less likely to move in the direction of Trump’s positions while those who identify as strongly conservative are more likely to respond to the liberal and conservative Trump cues.
• Those who are lower in political knowledge, are strongly partisan, approve of Trump, or regard themselves as very conservative were especially susceptible to the cue.

Secondary or reinforcing findings

• Most Republicans are party partisans who emphasize group attachment over issue positions.
• Self-placed, symbolic (rather than operational or programmatic) ideology is closer to a social identity than it is to a reasoned statement about one’s policy preferences or issue consistency. Seeing oneself as a strong conservative is no impediment to abandoning traditionally conservative positions. Even the strongest symbolic conservatives are just as likely, if not more so, to change their ideology in response to party-leader cues.
• When people symbolically label themselves ideologically, they are reacting in a way that we would expect a partisan loyalist to react rather than someone with deeply held issue positions.
• Polarization – at least in the public – is less principled than we might imagine. It has much more to do with partisan loyalty than it does with ideological principle.

Discussion

These three papers and the one referenced by the earlier post provide a meaningful context to explore how our information-communication ecology influences behavior regarding the pandemic. Democrats and Republicans generally have different responses to the pandemic, relative to their stances on adhering to public health guidelines (masking and social distancing), the relative difference in the importance attached to the public health consequences versus the economic consequences of the pandemic, and even to the relative significance or importance of the pandemic.

On this last point, a recent poll reflects what to me is an extraordinary difference in opinion regarding the pandemic: A late August 2020 CBS tracking poll of registered voters showed that 57% of Republican voters and 57% of self-labeled conservatives found the number of COVID-19 fatalities (about 170,000 at the time of the poll) acceptable compared to 10% of Democrats and 8% of liberals.

The next several posts will try to determine how this COVID-19 polarization occurred by focusing on the differential role played by the country’s information/communication ecology. Given Trump’s ability to alter the behavior and perhaps the values of Republicans, especially conservative Republicans special attention will be paid to Trump’s unique information and communication style, which often strongly influences many Republicans.