Plutocratic Populism

“It is impossible to make sense of our current politics without wrestling with this central contradiction of the past twenty-five years of Republican governance.” This quote identifies the central paradox in understanding our current political situation as addressed in a recent paper by Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson. The “contradiction” in the quote refers to (1) the biggest complaint about taxes among ordinary Republicans has consistently been that the rich and corporations do not pay their fair share vs. (2) the intent of governing Republicans to ensure that these groups increasingly pay less taxes.

Our current political scene generates a great many topics that seek to explain our polity of today. These topics include among others political polarization/division, populism, the politics of resentment, voter suppression, campaign financing, and income/wealth inequality. All these factors and others play a role in determining our current political scene.

This post analyzes what may be the most important core factor in helping us to understand where we are politically as a country.

Plutocracy

Hacker and Pierson posit that plutocratic populism best describes our nation’s current unique political structure. They borrow the phrase from Washington Post columnist Fareed Zakaria’s opinion piece entitled “Maybe Trump knows his base better than we do.” The rise of plutocracy provides the basis for our current political climate. [See earlier post on plutocracy.] Plutocracy (see prior post) presents conservatives with a political challenge.

The Republican Party’s entwinement with plutocracy began in our era in the Reagan administration and its deep cut in the taxes paid by the wealthy and business. Coupled with this dramatic cut in taxes the Reagan administration voiced at best a cynicism regarding the role of government, especially in terms of welfare assistance broadly defined, and labor unions. Perhaps a more significant inflection point occurred in the mid- ’90s when congressional Republicans became the driver of conservative policy. After the Gingrich revolution, congressional Republicans began a concerted move to the right on economic issues. George Bush, more conservative than his father, then became president. The tax cuts for the wealthy and business continued.

While Congress and the administration implemented these plutocracy-oriented initiatives, wealthy donors increasingly gained influence in the Republican Party. Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpal, and Sclar note that “the sustained efforts of organized groups and networks of political donors, who work together over many years between as well as during elections to reshape politics and agendas of public policy” became an important aspect of plutocratic influence in American politics.

Although these megadonors became influential in both conservative and liberal political spheres, they conclude that “the progressive consortium clearly remains far behind the Koch network in nurturing cross-state capacities. Not only do left-leaning cross-state organizations receive much less largesse from Democracy Alliance donors and work with much smaller budgets than the conservative troika powerhouses, the overall reach of the left efforts falls far short of the reach of conservative cross-state networks.” The Koch network became a shadow party within the Republican Party and pulled the Republican Party even farther right as they “pushed relentlessly and effectively for plutocratic policies.”

Hacker and Pierson express the significance of this by noting “the tightly connected long-term trends of worsening inequality and the growing extremism of the American right.” They opine that inequality “has received scant attention amid our current political travails. It’s one narrow passageway into our ongoing dialogue is revealing: a focus of the ‘left behind,’ the communities far from booming cities that have suffered economically over the past generation. These struggling areas gave Trump surprising and decisive support in 2016.”

As this plutocratic alignment occurred, the Republican Party turned its back on the middle class as it increasingly espoused tax cuts for the wealthy and business and criticized government spending, evincing antipathy for even Medicare and Social Security. The Republican Party also began to stake an increasingly radical position regarding government regulation especially in the financial sector and in climate change.

Populism

How then did the Republican Party deal with the challenge of enacting plutocratic values in the face of the average Republican voter who was not disposed to embrace these values? According to Hacker and Pierson, the party embraced racial resentment, antisystem outrage, and significant measures regarding voter suppression. In other words, the Party maintained the support of its relatively smaller white working-class base “through the manufacture and exploitation of tribalism, the demonization of political opponents, and increasingly shrill appeals to racial, ethnic, and cultural loyalties.” The Republican Party could not move toward the center on economic issues, which would harm their plutocratic alliances.

Electoral geography enabled the Party’s move to a smaller but more intensely supportive base of white working-class voters and rural voters while maintaining its plutocratic alliances. These electoral advantages include (1) the electoral college, (2) the outsized advantage of rural states in the Senate, and (3) their more than proportionate control of state capitals that facilitated gerrymandering of House and state election districts and various forms of voter suppression.

Interestingly, Hacker and Pierson point out that this electoral strategy further enabled the Republican Party to pursue upward redistributive policies although these policies harm areas of the country where Republican electoral strength is at its highest. Party members more fear competition from their right flank than backlash from their moderate voters.

The growth of a powerful conservative media ecosystem reinforces the conservative ideology enabled by the Republican Party’s electoral strategy. In the words of Hacker and Pierson, “The world of conservative media is very distinctive. It is its own ecosystem, with its own rules. Indeed, Fox and other major outlets are closer to representing a new kind of social movement – albeit one fixated on profits – than a set of conventional news organizations. And this media movement has big effects, becoming a vital source of GOP persuasion and electoral strength.”

Hacker and Pierson find that the right-wing media has altered the Republican Party by increasing its tribalism among both the average Republican voter and Republican politicians. The conservative media gives cover to Republican politicians for a wide range of “norm-busting behavior.” The Republican base increasingly trusts only a small number of conservative news sources. Importantly, this intense conservative ecosystem motivates the GOP base by negative partisanship and affective polarization. This suggests that many people who thought Trump was unqualified voted for him because they could not vote for his Democratic opponent.

On the issue of the relative significance of economic dislocation or racial animosity, Hacker and Pierson see this as false opposition. Their position is worth quoting: “Racial animus and a sense of decline are both ingredients in a poisonous stew that has been simmering for decades, with organized forces within the conservative coalition steadily turning up the heat. Moreover, as we have tried to show, this ‘horse race’ approach ignores the biggest way in which runaway inequality fostered Trump’s rise: it was a motor force behind the Republican Party’s turn toward strategies of division and demonization. The party embraced the plutocrats even as the policies embraced by the plutocrats contributed to the economic devastation of the white working class. A backlash against immigrants and racial minorities does not require America’s extreme inequality. But right-wing populism is most potent where, and among those who feel, opportunities for economic security and advancement have been lost.”

Plutocratic Populism in Power

While plutocrats remain wary of Trump’s various incursions into right-wing populism, they have not had to compromise much on their key policy goals due largely to the Republican Party elite. The Congressional Republicans have remained strongly behind a conservative economic agenda. They have succeeded in enacting a massive tax cut for corporations and the wealthy and have confirmed appointees that actively support deregulation, especially in finance, consumer protection, labor, and the environment. Perhaps more importantly, they have secured business-supported conservatives to the Supreme Court. The plutocrats only loss the Republican inability to rescind the Affordable Care Act. While there have been skirmishes over international trade and tariffs, these have not greatly affected plutocrats.

Yet, Hackett and Pierson suggest that the Republicans may have created a “Frankenstein monster” problem. Because the party elites needed the support of an emotional voting base, they may have facilitated an electorate they can no longer control. Trump, not the party’s elites, now controls the base. Trump’s low approval ratings helped generate the loss of the House in the mid-term elections. The power of the Executive now exceeds the power of the party elites in Congress. The issue for the 2020 election is whether an unstable alliance between the plutocratic wealthy donors and its much less affluent electoral base remains relatively stable. Or does the unpopularity of Trump require an even more enraged and frenzied base to secure reelection?

The authors conclude by commenting, “What can be said is that the roots of Trumpism go back much farther than the short presidential career of Donald J. Trump. It will take much more than a lost reelection bid to purge the GOP of the plutocratic populism that increasingly defines American politics.”

Comment

The Hacker and Pierson paper presents a macro view of our current political scene. The plutocratic (the wealthy, corporations, and business) theme runs strong, which I think they correctly emphasize. Their plutocratic theme runs long or historical as well. Again, I think this is an accurate portrayal.

Plutocracy

Beginning in earnest in the early ’70s, the business community and its wealthy owners initiated a broad and coherent, if not orchestrated, set of actions designed to secure a heightened place in our society and polity as well as in our economy. Much of the strength of this theme was libertarian-oriented (freedom from state oversight and an unfettered free market), joined by interests who otherwise favored limited government and reduced taxes, in part to starve the state. This coherent set of actions was also geographically broad-based including national think tanks as well as local think tanks. It placed importance on grassroots activities and had a state-based focus as well. This coherent plutocratic theme was well established by the late ’70s and became broadly manifest in the early ’80s. It remained in power through the following decades, through some dips, and remains powerful today.

The plutocratic theme became opaque, moved to the background, as media and other opinion-makers focused on the right-wing populism theme and Trump’s energized/enraged voters. One of the paper’s weaknesses, perhaps, may be its quick and superficial sketch of populism. But others have provided and continue to provide an array of details of right-wing populism.

The divisions of populism

Plutocracy and inequality have long and continued roots in our polity. So too are many of the cleavages and divisions Trump has made decisively more significant in his efforts to engage and enrage his base of support.

At a presidential level, George Wallace’s presidential campaign stressed racial division directly. He also counted as his political enemies bearded hippies, pornographers, sophisticated intellectuals who mocked God, traitorous anti-Vietnam war protestors, welfare bums, and “pointy-head college professors who can’t even park a bicycle straight.” As president, Richard Nixon pushed his “Southern strategy” seeking support from whites and stressing a “law and order” theme and a “states’ rights” theme that weakly camouflaged anti-black rhetoric. He pitted the “silent majority” of Americans against anti-war protestors.  His vice president, Spiro Agnew, said: “a spirit of national machoism prevails, encouraged by an effete corps of impudent snobs who characterize themselves as intellectuals.” As governor, Ronald Reagan criticized welfare recipients and lawless, rule-breaking college students. As president, he continued his mythical welfare queen trope, argued that government was part of the problem and not the solution., and said he believed in states’ rights. He also advocated that taxpayers should not “subsidize intellectual curiosity.” President George H.W. Bush became infamous for his racist Willie Horton ad, which he later disavowed.

Anti-Muslim and anti-immigration statements did not appear during these years. But one can argue that our recent anti-Muslim resentment or fear replaced our long history of vilifying “Godless communism.” Although there is a long history of anti-Latino sentiment and actions, these until recently have been relatively localized. For the past several years anti-Latino sentiment and actions have nationalized and have become more dramatic. Trump initiated his presidential campaign in 2015 with extensive anti-Latino immigration comments.

Supreme Court

From my perspective, the paper too lightly touches on the federal judiciary. Specifically, the Supreme Court has been plutocratic-oriented for a while, especially if one focuses on the business community as part of that orientation. For example, an article in the Minnesota Law Review ranks the Supreme Court justices from the 1946 term through the 2011 term relative to their support of business. This entailed a ranking of 35 justices. Five members of the 2011 Court scored in the top nine: Alito (#1), Roberts (#2), Thomas (#5), Kennedy (#6), and Scalia (#9). Among this group of five, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh replaced the two lowest-ranking, Kennedy and Scalia. Given their rulings on lower court decisions Gorsuch and, especially, Kavanaugh would probably rank higher as being pro-business than Scalia. In other words, Trump’s nominees are more likely to be more plutocratic re business decisions than cultural conservatives. For some views on this, for Gorsuch see here, here,, here, and here. For Kavanaugh, see here, here, here, and here.

Regarding the federal judiciary, at the time of this post, the Senate has confirmed 170 of Trump-nominated justices to the federal bench. A Senate rule change by Senate Majority Leader McConnell reduced the debate time for each nominee to two hours from the previously practiced 30 hours. This change dramatically increased the speed of Senate confirmations. These confirmations occurred although the American Bar Association ranked nine of these nominees as “not qualified,” an exceptional step by the ABA. Also, Also, eight of Trump nominees have had their nominations withdrawn due to quality problems.

Unlike legislation, which can be amended or overturned at any time, especially with a change in the controlling political party, federal justices are confirmed for lifetime appointments. If any action of Congress should entail a supermajority requirement, it should be the appointment of lifetime judges. To the extent that judges are confirmed by a majority of just several votes, a slim Senate majority, in a Senate structural oriented to control by less populated states, results in rule by the minority.