Trump as a Caring Leader? (3B)

The COVID-19 pandemic prompted me to delve deeper into care ethics. I wanted to understand the extent to which our society was a caring society and if we as a nation could become a more caring country. Consequently, I started this series of blog posts. More basic, I started this blog to help me determine how and why Donald Trump was elected president. Also, I wanted to understand how he would perform as a leader, how he would govern our country. I now turn to this point by asking how Gabriel’s paper may be applicable to Trump.

It is impossible for me to see Trump as a caring leader. However, one can develop an understanding of how or why Trump’s core followers may see him as a caring leader. I will do this in two steps each with two sections. The first step develops a conceptual framework. It first uses the Parry and Kempster paper referenced by Gabriel. Second, it then uses a later paper by Parry et al.

The second step provides an empirical analysis of Trump voters. It does so in two different ways. First, it examines counties wherein Trump gained more votes in 2016 than Romney did in 2012. The second uses a survey of self-identified Republican and Republican-leaning voters. Although these are only two of hundreds of analyses of Trump voters and Republicans, their content and conclusions resemble many other empirical studies. This is not to say that the two analyses I use cover the entire spectrum of Republicans or Trump supporters. But their findings and conclusions are not outliers.

Conceptual framework

Parry and Kempster

Parry and Kempster focus on a follower-centric view of charismatic leaders. They review several papers that suggest charismatic leaders have a love-hate relationship with followers. “Charisma can be construed as patriarchy in terms of sustaining power, domination, control, rank, and status as well as a means of demonstrating love, protection, support, and fidelity.” The authors try to explain the relationship between followers and a charismatic leader. The role of emotion was very important in followers’ discussions of someone who they perceived as charismatic. After running several iterations of discussions about charisma from a followers’ perspective they determined that “affection and happiness appear to be the emotions most usually associated with the relationship.”

The authors also conclude that charismatic leadership relates to identity. This identity is linked with “love as seen as a patriarchal relationship involving discipline and tough-love.” They suggest that “the charismatic relationship is perhaps more a form of ‘blind love.'” This love engenders in followers a sense of dependence and powerlessness. The affection and fondness of followers to the charismatic leader results in followers not wanting to disappoint the leader. Parry and Kempster go on to say that one can view the follower-charismatic leader drama as a series of dramatic performances that occur on a stage. Importantly, the charismatic leader takes the lead in generating this series of performances to which the followers reciprocate, in essence giving charisma to the leader.

Parry et al.

I now turn to the Parry et al. article, published in 2019, four years after the publication of Gabriel’s article. My guess is that Gabriel might have revised his article had he first seen this paper by Parry et al., which was finished after Parry’s death. It is a follow-up and further development of the earlier article by Parry and Kempster.

This paper also takes a follower-centric perspective. Charisma is seen in terms of the followers’ perceptions and responses to the leader and not the personal qualities of the leader. It focuses on the emotional connection between followers and the charismatic leader. The authors want to draw out the connection followers have toward the leader they see as charismatic. Their premise is that a “sense of belonging and community that a follower feels towards leaders is a strong and enduring aspect of charismatic leadership.” The primary emotional connection is a “sense of belonging and being linked to or part of a community.”

This sense of belonging and community occurs through a process of frame alignment. Frame alignment refers to the way in which values and interests become congruent between followers and leaders. Through this process, followers develop a social identification whereby they identify with the group following the leader and not with just the leader. This social identification develops feelings of belonging. Referring to earlier studies, the authors note that charismatic leaders often embody the prototypical attributes of the group thereby developing a collective endorsement of the leader.

The paper suggests that two variables significantly help develop followers’ sense of belonging to the leader. One is the extent to which the leader is accepted to be part of a community. The second is the follower feels positive emotions towards the leader. The first of these is more significant than the second. The authors point out that “neither negative emotions towards the leader, nor feelings of alienation or dependency have any statistical effect on the sense of belonging that the follower feels.”

In the qualitative part of the study, respondents provided metaphors or descriptions of a charismatic leader. The largest set of responses (23%) saw the charismatic leader as a “knowledgeable guide” using such descriptions as “elder in a pack of lions” or “house mother of a boarding house.” The second (14%) and third (14%) dealt with “strong leader” (“mountain,” “make you persevere,” “solid as a rock”) and “popular” (“a people magnet,” “social Butterfly”). But there were also strong negative metaphors such as “like a glossy magazine” that “lacks depth/substance” and “a poisonous spider . . . waiting for prey.”

The authors conclude by saying the sense of involvement with the community adds to the relationship between followers and the leader. “If a follower rates being part of a community highly, then she/he is very likely to also report a sense of belongingness toward the leader.” The relationship to the community becomes the most consistent relationship in their analysis. It explains why followers can have negative feelings toward a charismatic leader while simultaneously following through on the leader’s requests – “not out of love, but from a sense of both the leader and the follower serving the same community.” Personal and social identification become blurred: “feelings of belongingness may be influenced by both by individual and group-level factors.”

Empirical analyses

The Trump margin

Rodriguez-Pose et al. examine what caused the increase in people voting for the Republican nominee in 2016, Trump, compared to those voting for the Republican nominee in 2012, Romney. They call this the Trump margin. They hypothesize that voters in counties with long-term economic and population decline but with strong levels of social capital provided the “Trump margin.” It is the dependent variable in their analysis.

The highest increase in voting shares for Trump (9% increase or more) occurred primarily in counties in the mid-Atlantic, Midwest, and Great Plains states, and within these regions primarily in an arc around the Great Lakes, including Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. They associate this Trump margin with the rise of right-wing populism. They conclude that “increases in the populist vote in the U.S. are fundamentally driven by the economic and demographic decline of strongly cohesive mid-town and rural America.”

The model the authors develop in trying to understand the Trump margins uses four variables.

1. 2016 per capita income in a county.
2. 2016 income inequality in a county.
3. The 2016 level of social capital in a county.
4. Economic and demographic change.

The authors used four proxies for economic and demographic change. Notably, these proxies were measured at the start of every decade from 1970 through to 2010, as well as for 2016.

1. Employment change.
2. Change in average earnings per job.
3. Change in average wages and salaries.
4. Population change.

Social capital consists of these four components.

1. The number of nonprofit organizations in a county excluding those with an international orientation.
2. 2016 census response rates.
3. Voter turnout in the 2016 presidential election.
4. A number of associational indicators, such as civic and social organizations, professional, religious, business organizations, and so on.

The highest levels of social capital were found in the Midwest, especially the Great Plains states of both Dakotas, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, and Wyoming.

The model controlled for several variables such as per capita income, population density, unemployment, education, and share of black and white populations.

They drew these findings from their analyses:

• Counties experiencing greater employment decline put more trust in Donald Trump than they did in Mitt Romney. Long-term-employment and population decline over a period of almost 40 years strongly connects with a swing to Trump.
• Declines in average earnings and in wages and salaries are disconnected from the Trump margin. These results chime well with the sprawling literature highlighting that the rise of populism in the U.S. has more to do with racial issues than individual economic factors and with a sense of alienation of the white working classes. However, they also powerfully relate to the literature that has focused on geographical dimensions and with long-term economic decline. In the US the slow demise of still strong communities that have been losing employment and population for some time triggers the reaction at the ballot box to a far greater degree than declines in earnings and salaries.
• The link between employment and population decline at the county level and Trump’s vote margin is not a recent phenomenon. Having said that, the more recent years have been more consequential than the earlier years. The 2008 Great Recession provided a great springboard for the rise of populist discourse and a populist candidate, but the seed had been planted quite some time earlier. This reaction at the ballot box is more about the long-term decline of communities shedding jobs and people than about the loss of earnings, wages, and salaries. It is not the poor that are threatening the political system but the large numbers of still relatively well-off people – often seen as the threatened middle class – still living in relatively comfortable lives but in declining places.

The authors make these concluding observations:

• It is middle- and working-class individuals, who live in communities that have seen better times and have for long experienced a slow, but relentless employment and population decline, and where social capital has remained relatively strong, that cast the decisive votes to put Donald Trump in office. Hence, social capital and local civic engagement may not have acted as positive forces but in a negative way through mechanisms possibly linked to local consciousness and identity.
• The declining American communities will probably continue to play ball with whoever pays attention to their plights and allows them to exact their revenge at the ballot box against what they consider an unfair and harmful system.

Ethnic antagonism and antidemocratic sentiments

This paper by Bartels covers a much different topic than the prior paper. Bartels discusses the erosion of Republicans’ commitment to democracy based on several surveys, primarily a January 2020 YouGov survey of 1,151 respondents who self-identified as Republicans or Republican-leaning Independents. He suggests that both Democrats and Republicans possess some antidemocratic tendencies. The statements used in the survey focus on sentiments much more supported by Republicans. Bartels focuses on these statements “because antidemocratic tendencies loom larger in the leadership of the contemporary Republican Party – and especially in the rhetoric of President Trump – than among Democrats.”

The paper identifies four survey statements to which the respondents gave one of five responses: strongly agree, agree, neither/unsure, disagree, or strongly disagree. The percentages after each of the following four statements represents that share of respondents who either strongly agreed or agreed with the statement. Bartels labels the results “antidemocratic sentiments.”

• It is hard to trust the results of elections when so many people will vote for anyone who offers a handout (73.9%).
• The traditional American way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save it (50.7%).
• Strong leaders sometimes have to bend the rules in order to get things done (47.3%).
• A time will come when patriotic Americans have to take the law into their own hands (41.3%).

Bartels explores the bases of these antidemocratic sentiments. He does this by identifying six “latent dimensions” or antecedents found in 127 distinct items in the survey with an average of 29 indicators per dimension. These six latent dimensions include:

1. Republican affect measured primarily by positive feelings towards Pence, Republican Party, Republicans, McConnell and negative feelings towards Obama, Democrats, Democratic Party, Pelosi, and Romney.
2. Trump affect measured primarily by positive feelings towards Trump and job approval.
3. Economic conservatism measured, for example, by positive feelings that life is better for most people and hard work can still achieve and positive feelings towards the rich and negative feelings towards government reducing income inequality and providing health care, child care, and raising taxes on the rich.
4. Cultural conservatism measured, for example, by positive feelings towards respect for the flag and the NRA and belief in the decline of manufacturing jobs due to bad trade deals and negative feelings towards people in big cities, journalists, Black Lives Matter, and abortion choice
5. Ethnic antagonism measured not only unfavorable feelings towards Muslims, immigrants, and other out-groups but also – and especially – concerns about these groups’ political and social claims. This includes perceptions that immigrants, African-Americans, Latinos, and poor people have more than their fair share of political power and get more than their fair share of government resources.
6. Political cynicism measured primarily by believing people like me have no say and government is too powerful and negative feelings towards trust in government, politicians, and Congress.

Bartels notes that several of these attitudes are strongly correlated, especially those between Republican affect and cultural conservatism and between cultural conservatism and ethnic antagonism.

He goes on to say that political cynicism is strongly related to distrust of elections, while enthusiasm for Trump bolsters support for strong leaders bending rules and patriots taking the law into their own hands. But he stresses that the factor most strongly associated with support for antidemocratic sentiments is ethnic antagonism. In other words, ethnic antagonism negatively affects Republicans’ commitment to democracy. Additionally, every Republican subgroup evidences a strong relationship between ethnic antagonism and antidemocratic attitudes.

The single survey item with the highest average correlation with antidemocratic sentiments was this:

• “discrimination against whites is as big a problem today as discrimination against blacks and other minorities.”

Not far behind were these survey items.

• “Things have changed so much that I often feel like a stranger in my own country.”
• “Immigrants get more than their fair share of government resources.”
• “People on welfare often have it better than those who work for a living.”
• “Speaking English is essential to being a true American.”
• “African-Americans need to stop using racism as an excuse.”

Importantly, the effects of ethnic antagonism are concentrated in the contemporary Republican Party. 98% of the Democratic and Democratic-leaning respondents had scores below the Republican average. Republicans and Democrats are sharply polarized on the topic of ethnic antagonism.

Bartels ends his analysis with this comment.

It is not fanciful to suppose that expressive support for bending the rules and resorting to force to protect one’s way of life is consequential for actual behavior – or that it could become even more consequential under inflammatory circumstances. These circumstances include political elites engaging in antidemocratic behaviors.

Trump as a caring leader?

Conceptual analysis

Gabriel approaches caring leadership through the lens of followers, which is the perspective I take here. But I amend his perspective via the two Parry articles. These articles suggest that followers emotionally connect with their leader, with affection for the leader being a key emotion. Love can have many meanings. Love often occurs when followers see their leader as one who sustains power, dominates, and controls in a way that gives followers a sense of protection and support. This in turn makes followers to not want to disappoint their leader.

The papers also highlight the importance of identity; followers identify with the leader. This identity is a social identity in the sense that followers feel they belong to a community. When this sense of belonging occurs followers’ values and interests become congruent with the values and interests of the leader. Followers accept the leader as an integral part of the community. Given this acceptance, neither followers’ negative emotions toward the leader nor followers’ feelings of alienation or dependency adversely affect the sense of belonging to the community. Followers will continue to act on behalf of the leader because followers feel they and the leader are serving the same community.

Empirical results

Thus one can see how many if not most of Trump’s followers see him as a caring leader. The Rodriguez-Pose et al. article suggests that residents of counties experiencing long-term economic and population decline but have kept a good degree of social capital supported Trump.

For decades, both political parties have pretty much ignored these counties in several ways. They gave nearly unanimous support for international trade agreements, globalization, and financialization. They gave very minimal attention or support to manufacturing, the negative trade balance of goods, outsourcing and offshoring, and median wages/salaries of workers, especially blue-collar workers. Democrats probably were more attentive to these concerns than were Republicans, but that difference was probably not significant.

Trump highlighted this issue much more so than anyone else in the Republican primaries, railing against the political elites and the “swamp” for ignoring these concerns. Trump not only promised to tear up international trade deals but also to take a strong stand on nation-to-nation trade balances, suggesting that many nations were ripping off the US, especially China. He also promised to de-regulate economic activity and bring jobs back to America. Finally, he attacked migrants and immigration for taking jobs away from Americans.

To the extent there were significant levels of social capital in these communities it would be an easy step to embrace a larger community of similar concerns across the country/region and to focus the local community on political action to support Trump. While these counties were spread across the country, these areas were most dense in the upper Midwest and Great Lakes states that were most important in Trump’s electoral college win.

The Bartels paper focused on a much different issue – the high degree of ethnic antagonism among Republicans and those who leaned Republican. Arguably, this theme dominated Trump’s campaigns. It was perhaps the most significant thread throughout his election campaign.

This theme acted as an umbrella for other more specific attacks on non-whites and non-Christians, on the demographic and cultural changes occurring in the country, on how hard-working whites were being taken advantage of by the “Other” – all the outgroups including Democrats and liberals. Perhaps to many, Trump was saying out loud what others said much more privately. And he was the only person running for president who not only said it out loud but said it in a language that others dared not to utter publicly. Words that may have resonated with those holding a high degree of ethnic antagonism.

It is now perhaps easier to see how his followers may see Trump as a caring leader. He was the only presidential candidate whose rhetoric constantly trumpeted issues and concerns that many had held for a long time. Issues and concerns that others ignored and often ignored in a dismissive and condescending way. He, and only he, cared about the things that were important to them. He identified with them and they identified with him. They and he became common members in a community of shared values and interests. While they may have disagreed with him on certain things, these were unimportant and did not and could not diminish his standing as their leader.

Discussion

In reflecting on these passages I am struck by several points. First, they helped me understand why Trump both refused and was unable to move from being a divisive campaigner to a presidential unifier. If he were to stop his constant drumbeat on these issues and his emotional and at times volatile embrace of his followers, he probably would become to many in his base just another politician. They may have still followed him, but with much less emotional intensity and interest. But if he continually cared about them, and constantly demonstrated that caring, he and they would remain part of a community bonded by strong emotional attachments. He wanted to and had to campaign throughout his entire presidency. His performances, especially his rallies and tweets, demonstrated a constant presence with his followers never feeling abandoned. He was always present to his base.

Note how these points reflect Gabriel’s two positive fantasies of caring leaders. (1) The leader cares for his/her subordinates, offering recognition and support, and (2) The leader is accessible and can be seen and heard when needed, even if his/her appearances constitute special occasions.

Second, it reinforced my own belief that the Republican Party more created Trump than Trump captured the Republican Party.* The key aspects of ethnic antagonism and the cultural divide package associated with it runs as an embedded thread, albeit not as strong or gleaming, from Goldwater, to Reagan (especially as governor and in his first presidential campaign), to Nixon, to Pat Buchanan, through to Gingrich and his acolytes and into the tea party and on to Trump. By the time Trump started to govern as a divider, unlike previous Republican presidents, and not a unifier, the Republican Party became very willing to accompany him.

(While I do not find it persuasive, some evidence (see here for example) suggests that Republicans’ ethnic antagonism may relate to their belief and understanding that minorities and non-Christians generally support and vote for Democrats and liberals – and that if these “Others” were Republicans the ethnic antagonism would greatly diminish.)

Third, Trump’s behavior as a candidate and president was necessary but not sufficient for his followers to continue to see him as a caring leader. Two additional factors were necessary. One is the way Trump communicates with his followers. The style, tone, and content of his rhetoric significantly affected his followers, in greatly influencing if not wholly determining what they believed and did not believe.

But he also needed an information/communication ecology that facilitated and reinforced his messaging. This ecology includes Fox News, conservative talk radio, and social media platforms, especially Facebook.

These two factors are beyond the scope of this series of blog posts but will be addressed in the series of blog posts on COVID-19.

Fourth, Bartels makes the point that antidemocratic attitudes are not limited to Republican subgroups. But four subgroups tend to be more antidemocratic. These include men (especially those without a college education). Those more favorable to the National Rifle Association or to Fox News. And for all the antidemocratic sentiments excepting “strong leaders bend rules” those in rural areas compared to people in small towns, suburban areas, smaller cities, and big cities.

All this may not bode well for those hoping the 2020 presidential election has “a calm unclouded ending untouched by the shadows of decay.”

Fifth, I agree with the Rodriguez-Pose et al. paper’s implication that the Trump margin voters can be swayed to support another candidate. These voters are probably Obama to Trump voters or voters who sat out the 2012 election. The voters supporting the antidemocratic sentiments indicated in Bartels’ paper are almost certainly locked into voting for Trump.

Sixth, I am struck by the problem of conflating, as much leadership literature does, employees/subordinates and followers. I noted in Part 3A that Gabriel usually uses the term “followers” but when he provides empirical examples he talks about “employees” or “subordinates.” Although common in the literature, this is a very problematic conflation. This problematic conflation occurs, in my view, for several reasons. I ask myself, how much of the leadership literature is (1) written by academics in business schools, or (2) by those with academic backgrounds in business, economics, or industrial psychology/sociology, or (3) by those whose practical experiences are predominantly in business?

Finally, when I look at Gabriel’s tables regarding fantasies, I see how Trump’s followers can see him as both a caring leader and a heroic leader. It makes me question the value of Gabriel’s articulation of caring leadership, at least as he defines it, which leads me to my conclusion.

Back to archetype

Gabriel’s archetype of the caring leader is the good shepherd. I am reminded of St. Augustine’s sermon On Pastors in which he describes wicked shepherds. He says to wicked shepherds, “You have failed to strengthen what was weak, to heal what was sick, to bind up what was injured (that is, what was broken). You did not call back the straying sheep, nor seek out the lost. What was strong you have destroyed. Yes, you have cut down and killed it.”

Perhaps Gabriel ignored too many of care ethics’ fundamentals to develop a much more practical view of caring leadership?

For a clear statement of this thesis see Stuart Stevens’ It Was All a Lie: How the Republican Party Became Donald Trump. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2020.)